

A hornlike rabbit escaping



Whosoever knows so-called conventional truth as totally dependently arisen, suppose to be a all-knowing Buddha only, ultimate truth is not even called truth too, because the total freedom from all reference points, pointing out the unblurred, unimpaired vision.

Whatever your Vajrayana lineage/tradition is, so far as genuine Madhyamaka is concerned, it is crucial to not take it for granted, but investigate. Here in the end you have to rely on your investigation only.

According to books there are many modifications in Tibetan Buddhism, such the distinction between Svatantrika and Prasangika, which were not emphasised in original India at all, such marginalization of Buddha Nature teachings lineage of Asanga, which according to the sources was the top of Mahayana teachings in India but in Tibet was deviated to „the Mind only” (Cittamatra) interpretation in order to show a supremacy of Tibetan Svatantrika/Prasangika. And of course in present Tibetan Madhyamaka there are also new other interpretations as Gelug Prasangika or Shentong.

In original India progressive meditations on emptiness used to be standard preparations for

such practices as Mahamudra. Not only original Madhyamaka of Nagarjuna and Aryadeva, but also system of Yogacara on Buddha Nature of Asanga and Vasubandhu.

In the book of Karl Brunnhölzl ("The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition", Snow Lion Publications, 2004, page 563) it is said that once the contemporary main Kagyü Mahamudra/Dzogchen master and scholar (also Lharampa Geshe) Khenpo Tsultrim Gyamtso Rinpoche was debating with some advanced Kagyü students from the Tibetan Institute for Higher Learning in Sarnath, India. They kept asking very eagerly what the "official" Kagyü position on various issues is. Rinpoche replied every time that it is of no importance what the commonly acknowledged stance in a certain camp is; we have to investigate and find out for ourselves what we personally think is correct.

If we look at the controversies between great masters or schools in this way, they can be helpful as models to gauge and refine our personal insights.

In the book of Karl Brunnhölzl (page 563) it is further said:

...In search of scriptural authority in Indian Centrist texts Tsongkhapa runs into a further problem, because the topic of identifying an object of negation (let alone differentiating it in terms Svatantrika and Prasangika) was never an issue in these text. Tsongkhapa cannot quote any texts by Nagarjuna, Aryadeva, Buddhapalita or Candrakirti. What does he do? His "Elucidation of the Intention" offers another one of his highly inventive solutions by quoting Santideva:.... totally out of context...

.... This is what Tsongkhapa's critics call a "hornlike object of negation": If you first fix a horn on the head of a rabbit and then remove it again, the rabbit might wonder what you are doing...

If a table is different from its real existence, in terms of affecting the clinging to this table, what does it do to the table itself if one negates some hypothetical "real existence" that is different from the table itself and is even said to be nonexistent?

Through negating the hornlike object of negation called "real existence" with regard to a table, we will neither relinquish the clinging to the reality of this table nor realize its ultimate nature. Even great masters from Gelugpa tradition, such as Janggya Rolpay Dorje (1717-1786), Dendar Lharamba (born 1759), and of course Gendyn Chopel, were not unaware of

this problem...

...In other words, our clinging to personal and phenomenal identities does not concern some abstract, nonexistent notion of "real existence" but what appears right in front of our eyes...

As Atisa's *Entrance into two realities* dractically clarifies:
*[The ultimate] being realized neither through
 Conceptual nor nonconceptual consiousnesses.*

Santideva's Bodhisattva's way of life agrees:
*The ultimate is not the sphere of cognition.
 It is said that cognition is the seeming."*

The above verses contradict Tsongkhapa's claim that even ordinary beings can realize the fully qualified ultimate reality through a correct reasoning consciousness... just in a conceptual way. This leads to paradox that ordinary beings realize ultimate reality, while the noble ones, such as buddhas and bodhisattvas, do not." (page.578)

In other words, the valid cognition is only the seeming, as above verses said. But what the seeming is? "Generally speaking, if a given philosophical system differentiates the two levels of seeming and ultimate reality, then in whatever way it does so, one it speaks about seeming, relative, or deceiving phenomena, it must also accept this mean that such phenomena are precisely something that is not established. Otherwise, why differentiate between two such levels?

Tsongkhapa claims the opposite when he says that even Prasangikas accept seeming reality as being established through conventional valid cognition."(The Center of the Sunlit Sky; page.561).

In contrast, "*Nagarjuna and Candrakirti demonstrated so extensivly is precisely that nothing makes sense when it is analyzed*". There is not correct assumption with regard to emptiness. And it is should be realized until not reference points at all.

There is not anything to realize, neither conventional truth nor ultimate. "...distinction between expedient and definitive meaning is itself only made on the level of the expedient meaning"(The Center of the Sunlit Sky; page.529). So it is the seeming only, the deceiving. If you find anything here, congratulations, but unfortunately it will be just one more reference point, let alone emptiness (Sunyata). Nagarjuna wrote: *"For those for whom emptiness is not possible, nothing is possible"*.

"Tsongkhapa claims that one of the unique features of Candrakirti's system is disintegratedness as a functional entity serves as the support to connect past actions and their results"(page.584; chapter. Can an absence perform a function?) But "to abstain from reifying things such as karma, cause and effect, in no way makes these things lack their justification or functioning. To the contrary... „*For those for whom emptiness is possible, everything is possible*” as Nagarjuna wrote (The Center of the Sunlit Sky; page.590). So may I ask what the purpose for findability'?

When you try to understand ultimate truth, I guess you should try conventional first because there is not possible in other way. But the problem is: you never even be close to what only seems to be ultimate. "In terms of the actual definitive meaning the Buddha never taught anything whatsoever". Don't you know buddha is only Dharmakaya, but seems to be Rupakaya only for us. All divisions belong to the seeming not to the buddhas. Contrary to it you prefer Tsongkhapa's "division" into existence only conventionally and non-existence only ultimately, instead of the freedom from all reference points such not existence, not non-existence, not both of them and not neither of them. Moreover, you locate existence only conventionally by stopping the abstract "real existence" only let alone doing it "hornlikely".

Kamalasila's *Stages of meditations* describes how it is done and He quotes "The dharani of entering nonconceptuality" and explains:
Through mental nonengagement, the characteristics of form and so on are relinquished
 (The Center of the Sunlit Sky; page.312):
 the more reification is weakened through Centrist analysis, the more vividly the certainty

about emptiness is experienced. Finally, such certainty does not need to be further enhanced...

(The Center of the Sunlit Sky; page.315): "For example, as children, many of us believed in the real existence of Santa Claus here on earth... (but) someday started to develop doubts... investigated further, questioned parents...finally discovered that the Santa Claus whom we saw at home every year was our uncle. Once we become absolutely sure there was no Santa Claus, we did not need to analyze...." (mental nonengagement)... "or keep repeating to ourselves "there is not Santa Claus, there is not Santa Claus" (*prapanca*; *reference point*; that we keep spinning according to Tsongkhapa).

Here, the Buddhas are like "parents", they told about Santa Claus to us in order to "liberate" us from it (*svatantra* arguments) although they already have realized there is no such. But for Tsongkhapa *svatantra* arguments seem to be not useful, as I think. For non-Tsongkhapa the both tools, Svatantrika and Prasangika, help to be closer to "liberation" through this mental nonengagement, up to the freedom from reference points.

(page.56) Atīsa says in his Centrist Pith Instructions:
For example, if you rub two sticks [against each other], fire comes forth. Through this condition, the two sticks are burned and become nonexistent. Thereafter, the fire that has burned them also subsides by itself. Likewise, once all specifically characterized and generally characterized phenomena are established as nonexistent [through knowledge], this knowledge itself is without appearance, luminous, and not established as any nature whatsoever.

Pawo Rinpoche clarifies what (this) mental nonengagement means:
Therefore, in general, "mental nonengagement" has the meaning of not mentally engaging in any object other than the very focus of the [respective] meditative concentration. In particular, when focusing on the ultimate, mental nonengagement has the meaning of letting [the mind] be without even apprehending this "ultimate." However, this should not be understood as being similar to having fallen asleep.

In Maitrīpa's system (Mahamudra):
just as a fire dies once its wood has been consumed, one determines the nature

of this examining and analyzing knowledge itself through seeing that it is baseless and without root. Then one rests in meditative equipoise in that which does not involve any sense of negation or affirmation whatsoever.

Nevertheless, these days I don't think you can find Madhyamaka teacher who is expert on it alone although realized. As I wrote Madhyamaka studies can be supplementary to Mahamudra and Dzogchen practice in Tibetan Buddhism but not necessary and you can find realized master through HYT or Dzogchen methods only. Of course these masters can advise if Madhyamaka suits you completely or not, but in some extent you should be familiar with it, see the 3 preliminary tantra topics: renunciation, Bodhicitta, Sunyata. Maybe the biggest difference between present Tibetan Buddhism Madhyamaka and original indian Madhyamaka is that present Tibetan Madhyamaka can not be without tantra to bring the complete result?

According to Santideva there is an infinite regress of any analysis (The Center of the Sunlit Sky; page.208):

*If what has been analyzed
Is analyzed through further analysis,
There is no end to it,
Because that analysis would be analyzed too.*

*Once what had to be analyzed has been analyzed,
The analysis has no basis left.
Since there is no basis, it does not continue.
This is expressed as nirvana*

...Since there is no purpose left for such analysis, once its specific task has been accomplished, it does not continue after the mistaken idea in question has been put to an end. The analysis stops on its own, just as a fire dies down as soon as the firewood has burned up. Once all clinging in terms of superimposition and denial has come to an end in this way, nothing but the empty and luminous nature of the mind in which there is nothing to be removed or to be added is laid bare as the fundamental state of all phenomena. This is said to be primordial nirvana.

Svatantrikas when present seeming reality, they say no more or less than that the seeming phenomena that perform functions operating through the power of illusionlike entities, as well as the illusionlike valid cognitions through which these phenomena are established, exist as such illusionlike phenomena. One can only talk about such entities in relation to certain causes and conditions that in turn perform functions and bear characteristics only through the power of still other entities that serve as the factors for presenting the former causes and conditions. In contrast, the false seeming is something that appears but cannot perform a function that corresponds to the way that it appears, such as a mirage, a hologram, or the notion of permanent sound.

The intention behind this presentation is to eliminate the poison of clinging to inner and outer entities by accepting dependent origination and valid cognition that operate through the power of seeming, illusionlike entities. Because of such descriptions, in India Autonomists were called “the Centrists who establish illusion through reasoning.”

However, even if it were just on the seeming level that such illusionlike phenomena were to operate through the power of seeming entities and were established through valid cognition, they would have to exist as such entities in an undeceiving way. If they really and undeceivingly existed as such entities, all seeming, conditioned phenomena would not be delusive.

(The Center of the Sunlit Sky; page.363) In terms of a Consequentialist (Prasangikas) system of their own, there is no presentation of anything to be proven or any means of proof. Nevertheless, they pronounce negation and proof in accordance with the world for the sake of eliminating the imputations of others. In the Autonomists’ own system, in terms of ultimate reality, there is also nothing to be proved nor any means of proof. However, in terms of seeming reality, through the justified presentations of what is to be proved and the means of proof as the technique to investigate for true reality, Autonomists (Svatantrikas) pronounce particular negations and proofs that eliminate the imputations of others. ...In brief, the VIII Karmapa says, with regard to the manner of what is to be proven

and the means of proof in terms of emptiness, the intentions of Autonomist and Consequentialist masters are not different. The only distinction lies in their slightly differing approaches as to how the correct view of the ultimate is generated in the mind stream and accordingly communicated to others.

So they both (Svatantrikas, Prasangikas) lead to the same basis-less "knowledge" without reference points, conceptuality and duality.

Moreover, (The Center of the Sunlit Sky; page.591) Tsongkhapa criticizes autonomous reasoning on the basis of specifically characterized phenomena established through conventional valid cognition,

but at the same time he claims that Consequentialists engage in negation and proof based on subjects, predicates, and reasons that are established through conventional valid cognition as appearing in common for both proponents and opponents. However, such establishment through valid cognition as well as something appearing in common for Centrists and their realist opponents is denied in detail by Candrakirti....

Finally, Tsongkhapa's Consequentialist system also makes use of the distinction between nominal and nonnominal ultimate reality, a feature that was clearly developed in Indian texts unanimously regarded as Autonomist."

So there are many Autonomist (svatantra) Elements in Gelugpa Consequentialism, even with "upside down" Candrakirti made of epistemological system of Dignaga and Dharmakirti.

In his use of the logico-epistemological system of Dignaga and Dharmakirti, Tsongkhapa definitely follows the main and most controversial innovation by the Autonomist Bhavaviveka, who was the first to introduce that system into Centrism. In many respects, in his version of Consequentialism, Tsongkhapa even employs it in a far more extensive way than Indian Autonomists, notwithstanding the fact that Candrakirti repeatedly rejected that system in detail.

Nonnominal ultimate reality refers to, as says (page.228) Bhavaviveka's Summary of the Meaning

of Centrism:

The ultimate is freedom from discursiveness.

Being empty of all discursiveness

Is to be understood

As the nonnominal ultimate.

Kongtrul the Great (page.439) The Treasury of Knowledge summarizes Consequentialism in five main points (with the first):

All phenomena are only nominally existent. Let alone from the perspective of reasoning, all presentations in terms of conventional valid cognition or nonvalid cognition and of anything that could be established by such valid cognition are rejected even on the conventional level. All phenomena are just mental imputations through language, thinking, and means of expression; that is, they exist only nominally. Thus, it is explained that horses and oxen in a dream and in the waking state are completely equal in terms of being real or false. This includes the rejection of autonomous reasoning in the sense that the subject and the three modes are established through valid cognition as commonly appearing to both parties.

In fact, any realization of the ultimate by ordinary beings as a nonimplicative negation for a correct reasoning consciousness can only refer to nominal ultimate reality, which still belongs to seeming

reality. However, Tsongkhapa insists that this realization of ordinary beings is a realization of actual ultimate reality, just in a conceptual way. But if actual ultimate reality is indeed realized by a conceptual consciousness, it follows that the ultimate itself is a conceptual object, which in turn rules out that it can be the object of the nonconceptual wisdom in the meditative equipoise of noble ones. This leads to the paradox that ordinary beings realize ultimate reality, while the noble ones, such as Buddhas and bodhisattvas, do not.

(The Center of the Sunlit Sky; page.316) Thus, from the perspective of the ultimate

expanse of emptiness, to claim that the conceptual object of the nominal ultimate—the absence of real existence by the negation of real existence—is the actual ultimate is nothing but a case of confusing the finger that points to the moon with the moon itself.

(The Center of the Sunlit Sky; page.583) However, it can only be repeated that all reasonings and negations work solely on the level of seeming reality. At best, as nonimplicative negations, they can refer to the nominal ultimate but never to the actual ultimate free from all discursiveness and reference points, such as existence, nonexistence, affirmation, and negation.

Kongtrul the Great explains differences between Sautrantika, Cittamatra and Svatantrika (Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé: "The Treasury of Knowledge. Book Six, Part Three: Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy"; Section II: Mahayana; trans. Elizabeth M. Callahan; Snow Lion Publications; Ithaca, New York; 2007):

Given the Sautrāntikas' position that external referents are hidden [phenomena], they (Sautrāntikas) are similar to Chittamātra Proponents of Real Images in considering dualistic appearances to be cognition (shes pa). Nevertheless, these systems differ as to whether "what casts [images]" (gtod byed) is an external referent or not: [for Sautrāntikas, it is an external referent that casts the image; for Chittamātra Proponents of Real Images, it is not].

Cittamatra The imagined [characteristic] is twofold:

(1) Imagined [characteristics] devoid of any characteristics (mtshan nyid chad pa'i kun brtags) are what in fact do not exist, but are conceptually imputed, such as the belief in a self (bdag lta) or something being substantially established.

(2) Nominal imagined [characteristics] (mam grangs pa'i kun brtags) are object-universals (artha-sāmānya, don spyi), which appear to thoughts, and the appearance of the dualism of perceived objects and perceiving subjects for the nonconceptual sense consciousnesses.

Sautrantika-Svatantrika accepts outer referents simply as conventions and discuss them in ways that concur with Sautrāntikas.

Yogacara Svatantrika does not differ from the previous ones [i.e., the Sautrāntika-Svātantrika-Mādhyamikas] in the way they put forth independently [verifiable] theses.

As a convention, they accept mere consciousness but not, however, outer referents. In this regard, their presentation is like that of the Chittamātra-Yogāchāras (Asanga/Vasubandhu)

So let me investigate. Svatantrika's conventions means it accepts outer referents object or mere consciousness object only from the perspective of others for the analysis of the debate with them to lead them to the freedom from all reference points, including whole the seeming. Original Yogacara also leads to this freedom because does not point-out this freedom as the "Mind Only" and never did although many non-indians did so mistakenly. So according to these quotes I don't agree with regard to "so called objects" in Svatantrika or Yogacara.

In his Rebuttal of Objections, Nagarjuna invalidates the standard objections to the Centrist approach and elucidates the nature of its dialectic approach. He denies the notion of valid cognition altogether:

*If your objects
Are well established through valid cognitions,
Tell us how you establish
These valid cognitions.
If you think they are established through other valid cognitions,
There is an infinite regress.
Then, the first one is not established,
Nor are the middle ones, nor the last.*

Thus, one would never even get close to validating the actual objects to be validated. No matter if Svatantrika or Prasangika. Moreover, I think we need more „elaborated” teachings (than svatantra positions) on Buddha Nature "to fill more this gap".

I found quotes from " In Praise of Dharmadhātu. Nāgārjuna and the Third Karmapa, Rangjung Dorje" (transl. Karl Brunnhölzl; Snow Lion Publications; New York 2007; page.106):

[According to the Gelugpa School, buddha nature means nothing but sentient beings' emptiness, which is held to be a nonimplicative negation in the sense of the sheer lack of real existence (Tib. bden grub).

On the more technical side, also in the Gelugpa system, a nonimplicative negation is categorized as a generally characterized phenomenon, which is defined as “that which is not able to perform a function.” So if buddha nature—and thus buddhahood—is nothing but a nonimplicative negation,

by definition, it could not have any qualities, let alone those of a Buddha, such as unlimited prajñā, compassion, omniscience. Nor could it perform even so much as a wink of enlightened activity.

There are anecdotes of Geluggas who, upon being asked in conversation whether a Buddha has wisdom or not, became more or less offended by such a “heretical” question. At the same time, in formal debate, they would strictly deny that a Buddha has wisdom. Similarly, it may be safely assumed that none of them would say “no” to the question, “Do you aspire to become a Buddha?” But does that mean that they are really inspired by the notion of wanting to become a nonimplicative negation?

The sutra says:

*What is the nature of the Thus-Gone One
Is the nature of beings.*

*The Thus-Gone One is without nature
And all beings are without nature.*

Vasubandhu’s Thirty Verses says:

*Based on the three kinds of lack of nature
Of the three kinds of nature,
It is taught that all phenomena*

Are without nature.

In The Sutra That Unravels the Intention the Buddha also said:

Having this threefold lack of nature in mind—the lack of nature in terms of characteristics, the lack of nature in terms of arising, and the ultimate lack of nature—I have taught, “All phenomena lack a nature.”

Moreover, if you do not practice teachings on buddha nature, the mere view is just like the Sāṃkhya Hindu position. Ju Mipham Rinpoche’s Exposition of the Madhyamakālaṃkāra

concludes even when considering Dzogchen:

Without finding certainty in primordial purity (ka dag), just mulling over some "ground that is neither existent nor nonexistent" will get you nowhere. If you apprehend this basis of emptiness that is empty of both existence and nonexistence as something that is established by its essence separately [from everything else], no matter how you label it—such as an inconceivable self, Brahmā, Visnu, Īśvara, or wisdom—except for the mere name, the meaning is the same. Since the basic nature free from the reference points of the four extremes, that is, Dzogchen—the luminosity that is to be personally experienced—is not at all like that, it is important to rely on the correct path and teacher. Therefore, you may pronounce "illusionlike," "nonentity," "freedom from reference points," and the like as mere verbiage, but this is of no benefit whatsoever, if you do not know the [actual] way of being of the Tathāgata's emptiness (which surpasses the limited [kinds of] emptiness [asserted] by the tīrthikas) through the decisive certainty that is induced by reasoning.

I think it is also of Je Tsongkhapa when considering HYT, although His marginalization of Buddha Nature teachings lineage of Asanga (which according to the sources was the top of Mahayana teachings in India) to Cittamatra interpretation only in order to show a supremacy of His Prasangika. Tsongkhapa modified Yogacara epistemology of Dignaga/Dharmakīrti into His prasangika also. I was written (Letter No. 1 about Gelug Prasangika and Shentong view at lamrimnotes.webs.com) that during the generation stage (bskyed-rim) one has to use Cittamatra in Gelug.

"Tsongkhapa's Final Exposition of Wisdom" (By Jeffrey Hopkins; Snow Lion Publications; Ithaca, New York; 2008) quotes:

-the necessity of not-stopping the analysis and inherent existence as "just one" (as I posted on "prapanca that we keep spinning" and inherent existence as "hornlike object of negation"):

(page.160) With respect to sustaining [meditation] within analysis in this way, it is not correct to stop analytical meditation upon holding that all conceptuality

whatsoever is apprehension of signs—that is, apprehension of true existence. For earlier I have proven in many ways that conceptuality apprehending true existence is just one class of conceptuality.

Nāgārjuna's statement in the "Essay on the Mind of Enlightenment":

How could emptiness be where

Conceptuality has appeared?

The Ones-Gone-Thus do not perceive

Minds having the aspect of object analyzed and analyzer.

Enlightenment is not present where

Object of analysis and analyzer exist.

indicates that those who have apprehension of true existence with respect to object analyzed and analyzer have no attainment of enlightenment.

-but the analysis is not performed during HYTantra

(Tsongkhapa's Final Exposition of Wisdom; page.158) Our own system is as follows: Even in the context of Highest Yoga [Mantra] the system (Vajrayana) of generating understanding of the view must be done in accordance with what occurs in the Middle Way texts. With respect to how it is sustained, on some occasions during states subsequent to meditative equipoise on the stages of generation and completion, one takes suchness to mind within analyzing it, but when those on the stage of completion who have attained the capacity to put penetrative focus on essential points in the body sustain suchness in meditative equipoise, although they definitely must meditate within setting [the mind] in the context of the view, they do not perform the analytical meditation of special insight as it occurs in other texts. Therefore, with respect to that occasion, do not posit analytical meditation as one-pointed meditation on suchness from within the context of the view ancillary to stabilizing [meditation].

So Tsongkhapa found something "just one" what even Nagarjuna didn't, instead of relinquish subjective clinging to it. *Nagarjuna and Candrakirti demonstrated so extensively that nothing makes sense when it is analyzed, not even such ordinary,*

everyday things as going -it is called Samsara and it is why you suffer (dukkha).

Why the lineage of vast activity of Asanga/Vasubandhu is the most perfect supplement, the top of Mahayana? Because of this soteriologically efficiency:

(The Center of the Sunlit Sky; page.452) Then there are those who talk in a one-sided way in terms of Mere Mentalism (Cittamatra) and say that the other-dependent nature empty of the imaginary nature is the

perfect nature. This is just something that is set up by their own minds, without an understanding of the true intention of the lineage of vast activity. For, following *The Sutra That Unravels the Intention*, the lineage of vast activity explains that the imaginary nature is like being affected by the disease of blurred vision; the other-dependent nature is like the manifestations that appear due to blurred vision; and the perfect nature is like the natural object of clear vision upon being cured.

This means that once the disease of blurred vision has been cured, the appearance of floating hairs vanishes. Likewise, when the fundamental disease of the most subtle level of the imaginary nature—mind's nature or the expanse of dharmas being blurred by the dualistic split into subject and object—is eradicated, then the seeming appearances of the other-dependent nature will vanish.

At that point, the more coarse levels of the imaginary nature—which come about through focusing on the appearances of the other-dependent nature and labeling them—automatically do not remain either. What remains is the perfect nature, the expanse of dharmas as it is, seen by the unimpeded, natural vision of personally experienced wisdom.

(“Maitreya’s Distinguishing Phenomena and Pure Being”; The Commentary by Mipham Jamyang Namgyal (1846-1912), transl. Jim Scott under the guidance of Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso Rinpoche; Snow Lion Publications; p.75) explains:

*"Here the traits of phenomena are defined
As duality plus assumption and formulation,
Whose appearance is the mistaken conceptual process,
Since what appears is not and is thus not real.
No referents have ever existed either
And, being but concept, consist of conceptualization."*

Ju Mipham comments it:

In line with the immediately preceding explanation, the traits of Samsara itself, here called "phenomena," are defined as the realm of manifestation, which consists of appearances involving a duality of perceived and perceiver plus the assumption that anything appearing in such a way actually exists in that way; this is accompanied by formulation, which applies terminology. This is comparable to a well-composed painting in which there appears to be a background and a foreground, even though there is none. The dualistic appearance of perceived and perceiver is merely one's own mistaken conceptual process, since what appears to the mind, namely the object, is not existent—even while it appears. This is illustrated by such examples as the strands of hair which appear to a victim of cataracts, because these do not exist as the objects they appear to be.

When a child ask you what is an ice-scream, what you will do? You may say "it is not a stick or stone" (prasanga), you can say "it is a dessert" (svatantra) or "very delicious frozen dessert" (buddha nature describing) but you can buy one and say "taste it and you will know" (pointing out).

But the problem is if one take these upside down when looking always and always again for the "didactically" valid object (lack of inherent existence), always keep it spinning, instead of actual shamata/vipassana when working directly how to access the actual suchness, in other words how stop clinging, how stop suffering (dukkha). If so, it will upside down everything. Moreover it will be just as upside down Shentong , Empty of the "actual" but not the "horn-like".

(The Center of the Sunlit Sky; page.132) However—and this cannot be repeated too often—the actual target in the context of negating the two kinds of identity is the clinging to these identities on the

subject side. In other words, the object of negation is a mistaken cognition, a wrong conception that apprehends something nonexistent as existent. Since there is no actual object of negation on the objective side, there never was anything objective to be relinquished. So “negating an identity” is just another expression for the process of letting go of our subjective clinging to imaginary identities. Of course, from the Centrist point of view, this clinging itself is not something real either. However, as long as there is an individual mistaken notion of an object, there is also the notion of a subject. Consequently, with the realization that an object is illusory, the subject that held on to it dissolves naturally. On the other hand, if there were an object of negation that was established as an actual object, we would not be able to relinquish it anyway, no matter how hard we tried. For no one can successfully negate something that actually exists or, for that matter, prove the existence of something that does not actually exist.

Thus, for Buddhist reasoning and meditation to be soteriologically efficient, it is crucial to acknowledge that their actual target lies not at the level of the apprehended objects—the notions of a real personal or phenomenal identity—but at the level of the apprehending subject—the largely unconscious and instinctive clinging to such identities.

Non-finding "this" object is not the same as to stop dukkha caused by "it" (sravaka) let alone to attain omniscience (buddhahood). It will be just one more reference point to bind you more to cyclic suffering (samsara). Whatever the "actual" object, "horn-like" object, "metaforic knowledge" object, "buddha nature" object, "svatantra" object, "prasanga" object, "non" object, "nonimplicative negation" object, "freedom from reference points" object.

When the fundamental disease of the most subtle level of the imaginary nature blurred by the dualistic split into subject and object is eradicated, then the seeming appearances of

the other-dependent nature will vanish.

At that point, the more coarse levels of the imaginary nature—which come about through focusing on the appearances of the other-dependent nature and labeling them—

automatically do not remain either. What remains is the perfect nature, the Buddha Nature.

Gendun Chopel in his "The Madman's Middle Way" (the university of chicago press • chicago and london; transl. Donald s. Lopez Jr.; page.90) explains by using some stories and quotes Santideva:

¶99 *In brief, that which exists within the conception of true existence and which is being seen in the presence of the conception of true establishment is left as it is, and then something else is refuted. It does not pass beyond what the foremost Lcang skya rin po che said: "Leaving this vivid appearance where it is, they search for something protruding to refute."*

¶100 *When the great tantric master Sangs rgyas rgya mtsho was asked by the foremost 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa what the difference of view was between Prasangika and Svatantrika, he pointed at a pillar in his room and said:*

"In the Svatantrika system, this wooden thing standing alone is the pillar.

In the Prasangika system, this is the basis of designation of the pillar.

It is there that a pillar exists in name alone, merely imputedly existent.

"The great geshe Arig (1726–1803) met Wa mang Pan.d.ita (Dbal mang dkon mchog rgyal mtshan,

1764–1853), who said [to the geshe], "Which of the five books are you versed in?"

[The geshe said], "I have studied Madhyamaka the most." [Wa mang] said,

"Then, what is this in the Prasangika system?" (312) and pointed his finger at

the table in front of him. [The geshe] said, "That is a table." [Wa mang] said, "It follows that it is not a table because of being the basis of designation of a table,"

to which he [A rig] was left with no reply. These two stories definitely point

to a critical issue concerning the views of Prasangika and Svatantrika. Thus,

one should know that the conception that this square piece of wood which

stands in front is a table is the conception of true existence in the Prasangika system, and is valid conventional knowledge in the Svatantrika system.

Similarly, one should know that saying that this four-cornered piece of wood that stands in front is a table is an assertion for others in the Prasangika system, and is an autonomous assertion in the Svatantrika system...

¶103 *Even the great Prasangika masters did not see anything beyond just this*

as the basis for positing the root of the conventional. Therefore, they assert

something renowned to the world as the presentation of the conventional.

¶104...

...It is a little closer to the tenets of Cittamatra, but the

Yogacara do not say that on that basis which gives rise to a common visual

there is a cup filled with liquid. They merely explain the way the habitual

potencies that abide in the foundational consciousness [alayavijñana]—the

single basis from which the different consciousnesses of the six types of beings arise—are awakened.

¶106 ...the master Candrakīrti said that if one utterly destroys in the face of reasoning all of these presentations of appearances, the afflictive obstructions are abandoned, and that the utter destruction of them in the face of perception is the abandonment of the obstructions to omniscience; [according to him] it seems that such [appearances] no longer exist for the Buddha who has exhausted the two obstructions.

¶107 Seeing a table wholeheartedly is an afflictive obstruction, and merely seeing it to exist with one's eyes is an obstruction to omniscience. Santideva said [at Bodhicaryavatara IX.30–31] that the way in which people at a magic show lust for an illusory woman is an example of the afflictive obstructions, and the way in which the magician himself lusts for the illusory woman is an example of the obstructions to omniscience.

There is the big difference between the afflictive obstructions and the obstructions to omniscience indeed. Only after the later you will be totally "beyond all reference points = unblurred vision (Dharmakaya, Sambhogakaya, Nirmanakaya).

(The Center of the Sunlit Sky; page.571) "In general, the Karmapa says, any meditation or conduct based on the notion

of an isolated nature of phenomena that is not connected to anything that bears this nature is not appropriate as either the foundation for the path to liberation or the remedy for obscurations. For any meditation or conduct based on a nature of phenomena that is unrelated to these phenomena cannot relinquish the two obscurations of clinging to the reality of these very phenomena as the seeming bearers of this nature. In terms of such a disconnected nature of phenomena, it does not matter whether it is said to be a nonentity that is a nonimplicative negation (as held by Tsongkhapa) or a permanent ultimate entity (as maintained by Dölpopa and others). Both are equally soteriologically ineffective...

In contrast to all the above misconceptions of emptiness, according to Mikyö Dorje, Autonomists and Consequentialists understand emptiness in a way that is soteriologically effective."

Mental or non-mental is not enough, conceptual or nonconceptual also. As I quoted: "[The ultimate] being realized neither through conceptual nor nonconceptual consciousness."

Even using common sense, when you not find out "there" for example a bacteria, it is not

the same as cured your body "there", not suffering. These days modern science is looking for "The Higgs particle" but if will not find it, it will be not the same as the end of the Universe, although "Standard Model of Particles and Forces of the Universe" will be still failed. But according to modern science everything eventually will make sense... don't worry, we will be enlightened soon by taking some kind of "horn-like" pill .

When a child keep repeating ""there is not Santa Claus, there is not Santa Claus" in lonely room, how he will discover that the Santa Claus is his uncle during the holiday party outside?

Berzinarchives.com adds: "The non-dzogchen systems of Gelug, Sakya, and Kagyu analyze three levels of mind or mental activity:

- Gross mental activity is sensory cognition, which is always nonconceptual.
 - Subtle mental activity includes both conceptual and nonconceptual mental cognition.
 - The subtlest mental activity underlying them all is clear light ('od-gsal), which is exclusively nonconceptual, but subtler than gross or subtle nonconceptual mental activity.
- Sutra and the lower classes of tantra employ subtle mental activity for the cognition of voidness. Only anuttarayoga, the highest class of tantra, accesses and uses clear light mental activity for this purpose.

Parallel to this presentation, sutra and the lower classes of tantra in the Nyingma system employ sem for the cognition of voidness. Only dzogchen accesses and uses Rigpa for this purpose."

I remember the Dzogchen saying " where is the Mind (tib.sem) there is no Rigpa".

But it seems to me obvious, that finally also Tsongkhapa don't want to miss "the holiday party instead be in lonely room". That why he created His "elaborated" HYT system and even in the end of His Lamrimchenmo He mentioned of necessity to enter Vajrayana. He is widely accepted as mahasiddha. If his "sutra" system was enough why than his "triple"

HYT? So Je Tsongkhapa to me is the best tibetan opponent for other tibetan Madhyamaka masters so far, even better than Dolpopa, maybe this was His main sutra purpose?

Düdjom Rinpoche says in “His History of Nyingma”:

“In Tibet as well, when the venerable Daö Zhönu [Gampopa] taught that the abiding nature of reality, as it is explained in the sutras, is the Great Seal, [his critics] maintained that this was not at all the teaching of the Buddha, saying it was “Takpo’s fanciful doctrine.” The all-knowing Rangjung Dorje [Karmapa III] and Chödrak Gyamtso [Karmapa VII] expounded [the teaching] in accord with the intention of the final transmitted precepts, but later Mikyö Dorje [Karmapa VIII] and others did not adhere to their view. When master Tölpopa declared that the ultimate truth was permanent and stable, the Tibetans considered him to be merely a Samkhya extremist. After the venerable Tsongkhapa had explained relative appearance to be logically verifiable later scholars assaulted him with HÜM! and PHAT!. . . . The great pandita Zilungpa [Sakya Chokden] had to be ejected from the Sakyapa ranks for explaining that the Analysis of the Three Vows was of provisional meaning. Moreover, the all-knowing Great Fifth, having studied and meditated upon the authentic teachings impartially (also Dzogchen), was very nearly excluded from the Gedenpa [i.e. Gelukpa] order. . . .”

(The Center of the Sunlit Sky; page.566) “Real existence” never appears for any kind of consciousness, since it is not a knowable . Also, to identify and negate such an extrinsic, abstract notion as the Centrist object of negation openly contradicts both the sutras and the Indian Centrist treatises. As The Prajñāpramita Sutra in Hundred Thousand Lines says: *Subhuti asked: “How should bodhisattvas train to understand that all phenomena are empty of their own specific characteristics?” The Blessed One said: “Form should be seen as empty of form, feeling empty of feeling, and so on.” Subhuti asked: “If everything is empty of itself, how does the bodhisattvas’ engagement in the perfection of knowledge take place?” The Blessed One answered: “Such engagement in the perfection of knowledge is non-engagement.”*

Candrakīrti explicitly clarifies in his autocommentary on The Entrance into Centrism: *Here, one speaks about emptiness [as the fact] that the eyes and so on [are empty] of these very eyes and so on. This makes it completely clear that [this is] the emptiness of a nature, whereas it is not an emptiness*

of one not existing in an other, [such as] “the eye is empty, since it lacks an inner agent” or “it is empty of the nature of apprehender and apprehended.”

The Commentary on Bodhichitta (Bodhichittavivaraṇa-nāma, Byang chub sems 'grel pa zhes bya ba, by Nāgārjuna) says:

When we awaken from a dream [we see that dream objects and waking objects] do not differ in their performance of functions.

Kongtrul the Great "Treasury":

As is said, horses and elephants in dreams or illusions and actual horses and elephants, as well as cows in drawings and actual cows, are equivalent in the way that they perform functions from a mistaken perspective.

Ju Mipham lists in Asanga (“Maitreya’s Distinguishing Phenomena and Pure Being”; The Commentary by Mipham Jamyang Namgyal (1846-1912), transl. Jim Scott under the guidance of Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso Rinpoche; Snow Lion Publications) many levels which obscured the realization of Buddha Nature:

- *What appears to the nonconceptual sensory faculty as a duality of perceived and perceiver*
- *The process of formulation conducted by the rational mind, which is conceptual and first makes the assumption that whatever appears to be a duality actually exists that way and then formulates it by assigning a specific term; this is a process which is internal and equivalent to the rational mind’s conceptualization of percept and perceiver*
- *The inner faculties, that of the eye and so on*
- *Outer objects, form and so on*
- *The principles of awareness, the eye consciousness, and so on*
- *Vessel-like worlds’ appearances experienced in common.*

Since these are all absent, suchness free of all these types of differentiation appears in its one taste. This is what is referred to as “the subsiding of dualistic appearance into emptiness.”...

Hence, wisdom devoid of appearances is one which transcends the parameters defining appearance as described above and is itself the clear light, all pervasive as space. This is called “nonconceptual original wisdom free of appearance.” It is essentially beyond consciousness and is thus not restricted to any domain whatsoever, whether that of the composite, the non-composite or any other. Since this means original wisdom itself does not fall into the category of appearances, it is not something distinct from pure being but is its intrinsic luminous clarity.... Because it rests in suchness, the abiding nature free of overestimation and denial wherein

the two truths are inseparable, it eliminates all wrong views, which fixate on theoretical conclusions.

There is the traditional Buddhist scheme of Indian Buddhist schools for the pedagogical purpose. All distinctions are not solid and only, but just for gradual pedagogical refine our personal insights, step by steps. Only according to this perspective distinction between "the new" Cittamatra, Svatantrika, Prasangika is correct. If one are using other order of steps than usual, it is only as a tool but not as the annihilation of the the traditional Buddhist scheme. Everybody can do it, not only the well respected masters, and one should it of course, if is useful. The best is the pointing-out to Rigpa without even using a single word.

Tsongkhapa's Unique Features of Consequentialism has a topic (The Center of the Sunlit Sky; page.557):
not accepting that the view of true reality is generated in the continuum of an opponent through autonomous probative arguments.

Our reference points can meet each other. In other words we have our collective karma to debate inside Samsara place of dukkha. So reference points (slightly different objects of the debate) can cause less reference points to occur or even collapse all of them in the between moment where not conceptuality at all but bliss for a while.

Looking briefly, it guess it deals with a Chapter of Lamrim Chenmo "Not negating enough" (The Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path to Enlightenment; Tsong-kha-pa, translated by the Lamrim Chenmo Translation Committee; Snow Lion Publication; New York) .

*(page.200) Now when you as an ordinary being determine that phenomena lack even a particle of essential of intrinsic nature, you find that emptiness - emptiness of intrinsic nature - is an attribute of the phenomena, such as form, that serve as its substrata. Since you have not stopped dualistic appearance, that emptiness is a nominal rather than ultimate truth.
 By accustoming yourself to that view which knows the absence of intrinsic nature, you will know it by perceiving it. For such a consciousness, all mistaken appearances stop.*

This refers to "Negating enough".

Very excuse me if I error it, but I guess Tsongkhapa find this "lack of intrinsic nature" which can be perceived during shamata directly and there is no need to collapse all reference points in order to discover what is beyond them, the some kind of basisless ground called "metaphorically" nonconceptual wisdom where the law of causes and effects (karma) could be somehow "unclear". The more you perceiving directly this "lack of intrinsic nature" the better you are enlightened until complete perceiving this "lack of intrinsic nature" when all mistaken appearances stop. Is it not?

Quote from Tsong-kha-pa's Final Exposition of Wisdom:

(page.160) *"With respect to sustaining [meditation] within analysis in this way, it is not correct to stop analytical meditation upon holding that all conceptuality whatsoever is apprehension of signs—that is, apprehension of true existence. For earlier [I] have proven in many ways that conceptuality apprehending true existence is just one class of conceptuality.*

This refers to "Not negating enough".

(page.93) *"In order for such to happen, it is necessary to differentiate between:*

- *inherent existence and mere existence*
- *absence of existence by way of its [the object's] own character and non-existence*

....When those are not differentiated, you do not pass beyond the two extremes of superimposition and deprecation since then once a thing exists, it exists by way of its own nature, and once something does not exist by way of its own nature, it is totally non-existent."

(page.101) *This is like propounding that in order to remove the suffering of fright upon apprehending a snake in the east despite there being no snake there, the demonstration that there is no snake in the east will not serve as an antidote to it, but rather one should indicate, "There is a tree in the west." For, one is propounding that in order to remove the suffering upon adhering to the true existence of what appears in this way to sentient beings, realization that those bases [that is, objects]—*

which are apprehended to truly exist—do not truly exist will not serve as an antidote, but that rather one must indicate that some other senseless base truly exists.

Do all reference points collapse? For me not, because the lack of intrinsic nature according to quotes is also a reference point (although nonimplicative negation I guess) and should be in this way "perceived".

(The Center of the Sunlit Sky; page.187) The definition of a nonimplicative negation is "something that is to be cognized by a cognition that directly cognizes it through merely excluding its specific object of negation.

(The Center of the Sunlit Sky; page.192) A sutra states:
*Those who understand this dharma of "being nothing whatsoever"
 Will be without attachment toward all phenomena.*

In this way, it is clear that such a nonimplicative negation is just a step toward the direct realization of actual ultimate reality. Otherwise, if ultimate reality itself were nothing but a nonimplicative negation, then it would just be some conceptual kind of nonexistence in the sense of nothing whatsoever. On the other hand, if ultimate reality were an implicative negation or something affirmative, then it would be something actually existent. Obviously, none of these categories applies to the actual or nonnominal ultimate, and there is no third possibility.

The Eighth Karmapa denies both the position that ultimate reality is a nonimplicative negation (or even one that is supposed to withstand analysis) and the position that ultimate reality is completely inexpressible. It seems that the first scholar to explicitly identify the ultimate as a nonimplicative negation was Chaba Chökyi Senge. Later, Tsongkhapa and his followers also adopted this position and held that actual emptiness is a nonimplicative negation that withstands analysis. However, if it were possible to arrive at something that withstands analysis, such as the nonimplicative negation "the lack of real existence," this would turn

the whole project of Centrism—the demonstration that there is nothing that withstands analysis—upside down.

The definition of a nonimplicative negation is “something that is to be cognized by a cognition that directly cognizes it through merely excluding its specific object of negation. By using it (this cognition) nothing withstands analysis. Since it is only the cognition, it is not the ultimate. As Santideva’s Bodhisattva’s way of life agrees:
*The ultimate is not the sphere of cognition.
 It is said that cognition is the seeming.”*

So what is realized by this cognition of the lack? the seeming only I guess. Moreover if it is still a reference point how does it act as an antidote to Samsara? This is our prapañca keep spinning only (reference point; sanskrit. prapañca; tib. spros pa).

Atisa’s Entrance into the Two Realities states:
*The seeming is asserted as twofold:
 The false one and the correct one.
 The first is twofold: [appearances such as floating] hairs or [double] moons
 As well as the conceptions of inferior philosophical systems.
 These arising and ceasing phenomena,
 Only satisfying when not examined
 And being able to perform functions,
 Are asserted as the correct seeming.*

(The Center of the Sunlit Sky; page.106) However, something that withstands final Centrist analysis is impossible. That which withstands temporary analysis is called the “worldly and yogic correct seeming,” but only in comparison with the false seeming.

(page.114) Since both afflictive and cognitive obscurations originate from clinging to really existing things, yogic practitioners put an end to all such clinging once they realize that all phenomena are primordially free from all discursiveness and reference points

The difference between the conceptual cultivation of a negation and direct

seeing may be illustrated by an example. When people with blurred vision consult a doctor, they might be told, "There is no doubt that you see all these things like floating hairs, but none of them really exists." By keeping this in mind, the patients may eventually cease to be confused and upset by these appearances. However, merely cultivating this notion of the actual nonexistence of what they see does not eliminate the appearances themselves. Once the patients become cured and thus see unobscured, open space without floating hairs, they obviously do not see "the nonimplicative negation of the real existence of floating hairs." Technically speaking, one may say that they see space "qualified" by the absence of floating hairs, but in terms of immediate experience, they just see "what is as it is," since it is no longer obscured by anything.

Furthermore, since also Tsongkhapa and his followers say that the meditative equipoise of noble ones is without appearance, how could a nonimplicative negation be perceived in such a meditative equipoise, if it does not even appear for it? And if something does not appear in the meditative equipoise of noble ones, how can it be said to exist as ultimate reality? What does not appear in their meditative equipoise could only be either their "mere seeming," the seeming reality of ordinary beings, or the false seeming (such as a hallucination).

Every master has one's own "better" interpretation and even own mode of translation, and it is obvious also in the case of Je Tsongkhapa. To give examples of His interpretation from Chandrakirti (Tsong-kha-pa's Final Exposition of Wisdom; p.114):

In that way also Chandrakirti's Supplement

to (Nagarjuna's) "Treatise on the Middle" says:

*[Buddha] said that all things have two natures,
Those found by perceptions of the real and of the false—
Objects of perceptions of reality are suchnesses,
[And] objects of perceptions of the false are obscurational
truths.*

This indicates that with regard to the natures of a sprout there are two—the natures of the two truths—and that the ultimate is found by

the former consciousness, whereas the conventional is found by the latter consciousness. It does not indicate that one nature of a sprout itself is the two truths in relation to the former and latter consciousnesses.

This is called the object side perspective.

And His interpretation from Shantideva's "Engaging in the Bodhisattva Deeds"(Tsong-kha-pa's Final Exposition of Wisdom; p.222):

*The ultimate is not an object of activity of an awareness.
Awarenesses are said to be conventionalities.*

...[Shantideva's] identification of obscurational truths does not mean that only awarenesses are posited as obscurational truths; rather, they are objects of awarenesses.

This is also the object side perspective.

Instead of:

*The ultimate is not the sphere of cognition.
It is said that cognition is the seeming.*

This is called the subject side perspective according to non-Tsongkhapa.

In „The Two Truths Debate. Tsongkhapa and Gorampa on the Middle Way”; By Sonam Thakchoe; Wisdom Pub. Bostan 2007) the author personally found Tsongkhapa more convincing. Here indeed Tsongkhapa claims that every phenomenon has the two natures which can be perceived as object: conventional and ultimate. The two natures correspond to deceptive or nondeceptive modes of appearances. But Gorampa holds that the two truths do not have any objective basis (like the Karmapa). All divisions belong to the seeming not to the buddhas.

How the conventional object, which is perceived by various sentient beings in their limitless various ways (e.g. animal, human, preta), can be the same also for Buddha who is no longer a sentient being? If it is the same, what about the suffering dukkha? For example for water by a hell being is perceived as lava and it suffers. Does Buddha also suffer?

Tsongkhapa's "The two natures" correspond to deceptive or nondeceptive modes of appearances. For example the table is perceived and the table's emptiness of inherent existence is also perceived. The agent who cognized the two truths may be one and the same individual. Ordinary beings have only conceptual access to ultimate, while aryas at the path direct access. Only Enlightened beings have simultaneous access to both truths.

According to Tsongkhapa conventional is not how a thing is but how it seems to be, ultimate is not how thing seems to be but how it is. In other words conventional is the dependent arisen and ultimate is the lack of inherent existence. The both necessary should be realized, but only Buddhas perceive both: the dependently arising "it" and lack of inherent existence of "it".

Without perceiving how precisely "they" are dependent arisen one can not accomplish the accumulation of merit for Rupakaya, and without perceiving the lack of inherent existence of "them" one can not accomplish the accumulation of wisdom for Dharmakaya. It is continuous progression (karma) of both until enlightenment. The "actual" dependent arisen is untouch and the lack of the inherent is not created, both are equally valid. There are no paradoxes as "metaphorical nonconceptual wisdom beyond all reference points".

It makes me sense of course, but as I quoted the masters:

the accumulation of merit never can be the "horn-like" when the "actual" is untouched and the accumulation of wisdom never can be the the lack of inherent existence as not created because "this lack" keep spinning only.

Realization of Sravaka's nirvana is not enough, because only the clinging to these identities on the subject side. So "the actual" subject side that apprehends something nonexistent as existent" should be touched until any imprints left (freedom from all reference points including this very freedom itself) in order to the not created "what is

beyond" be discovered with all its qualities (Dharmakaya, Rupakaya).

The subject side perspective: Animals, Humans, Pretas perceive differently. But there is the Path. Because of this Path, sentient beings by subject side perceive gross Nirmanakaya, bodhisattvas free from clinging perceive subtle Sambhogakaya, buddhas?.... because there is not any division at this level "they" can not continue to perceive but the Dharmakaya. The object of all of these is what? The division is where? Never was at the first place but only seems to. But until it seems to be division is also the Path. This Path leads to the no division. When division between "Buddha" and "sentient being" is completely no more, it means the all qualities (Dharmakaya, Rupakaya). This I meant by my sentence: All divisions belong to the seeming not to the buddhas.

What about if Tsongkhapa object side corresponds to non-Tsongkhapa subject side? Maybe the both are equally valid, but only different perspectives?

The "actual" conventional object side is just the dependently arisen precisely as "it", if you want to know precisely the conventional "it". What is left, the object of the ultimate, is the lack of the inherent essence projected on "it".

"The actual" subject side, that apprehends something nonexistent as existent, is only conventionally "touched" until any imprints left (freedom from all reference points including this very freedom itself).

So when one analyzes from the object side there are the two objective truths: conventional "it" and ultimate "it", but when one analyzes the subject side, there is not even a reference point called the freedom from all truths, let alone the two truths.

If one want to apprehend the objects side conceptually in "infinite regress" (the hornlike objects are used when they keep spinning), one has to built epistemological very complicated system that should fit together. The subject side perspective on the contrary, not so complicated but direct (without any hornlike possibility or the "keep spinning").

For perspective of Je Tsongkhapa there is precisely dependently arisen "object" since beginningless time and from infinitive causes/conditions and only buddhas are able to perceive how "it" is made by sentient beings. We (sentient beings) should "keep spinning" this object side until omniscient perceiving how this "infinity" precisely (buddhahood).

What a tremendous work?

For perspective of non-Tsongkhapa, since the seeming is precisely dependently arisen "object" since beginningless time from infinitive causes/conditions, so "it" never was at the first place but only the subject side of sentient being made "this" division. For buddhas "this division" is no longer.

What a direct pointing out?

Buddhas "How it is made by sentient beings" object side = sentient being actual subject side "dukkha" (not for buddhas).

So Tsongkhapa and non-Tsongkhapa (Gorampa, Karmapa Mikyo Dorje, Mipham) would fit together at last. "They" both are useful to "collapse" all perspectives. Are they not?

Unfortunately, not exactly. This precisely dependently arisen "it" since beginningless time from infinitive causes/conditions is the object only by just one class of conceptuality according to "final" Tsongkhapa ("Tsongkhapa's Final Exposition of Wisdom". By Jeffrey Hopkins; Snow Lion Publications; Ithaca, New York; 2008; page. 160). So this "lack" is the same for all other objects made of their infinitive causes/conditions and should be keep forever spinning although will be very different objects. Some kind of shortcut from the way of the infinite.

What a simple work?

Like Cittamatra "Mind Only" School, it seems to me to be "Just One Only" School but "Hornlike" for non-Tsongkhapa (Gorampa, Mikyo Dorje, Mipham).

I guess this „lack” should be done for the actual object according to how it is made

precisely by present cause/condition and when next moment or condition will occur, or another object will be chosen, than should be also another „lack” respectively? But is it possible since moments arisen instantly and cause/conditions are nearly perceived? „A lack” should be of individually/uniquely made inherent existence, not the lack of the same (for all) existence, some kind universal.

If you want know how is the seeming precisely (e.g. hand), it is impossible for you sentient being, because infinite causes/conditions since beginningless time. Nothing functions, nothing makes sense for you sentient being. I guess only all-knowing buddhas could know it precisely (e.g. how you "finally get" this hand since beginningless time of your previous lifetimes). This is what Nagarjuna's The king of reasonings -the reason of dependent origination- is all about. Look for example on interdependent connection between ordinary things on earth and the sun, galaxies... since beginningless time. Everything has influence. For example ordinary atoms of the iron inside your body were made by the explosions of supernovas milliards years ago. That is interdependent link when you looking for example how is your hand, one among million other equally important links. So are you able to identify them? I guess Je Tsongkhapa was not aware of it.

Samsara doesn't function, it just seems to function? What about e.g. a hand? Yes, it seems from object side, but you should object the hand by lack of its unique inherent existence, not lack of the same (universal for all phenomena) inherent existence, if you want "how the seeming". Yes, it seems from subject side, but you should subject the actual hand "in front of your eyes", if you want to stop the seeming (dukkha).

If you somehow protect the "functional" seeming conventionally and lack of inherent nature ultimately, you only protect "dependent nature" reference points and "the imaginary" reference points. So you will be safe as the "the best and only" Prasangika free from some kind of "metaphorical" Cittamatra. Ok, your choice. But what will you do with these two kinds of reference points?

But why are we so interested how is the seeming although this tremendous infinite work

but not interested how stop this seeming? "Find" subject perspective, not object. We have no choice because we can not take what is impossible for us sentient beings.

Is there a great need to understand pramana? Partially, because it is tool only. Should be aware: Don't look at the finger instead of the moon. Stop "keep spinning".

So nothing functions, nothing makes sense in Samsara dukkha. There is no non-mistaken for example a hand. You have to be free from all reference points completely. As I understand, Tsongkhapa insists the freedom only from some kind of universal inherent existence, the same for all phenomena, not from the functioning seeming, e.g. the functioning hand itself. Non-Tsongkhapa insists the freedom from the whole seeming, not only partially (because also free from the functioning seeming), let alone "hornlike" universal which is not even partial but paradox. You are looking only because you are sentient being, although there is neither the perceiver, perceived nor the process of perceiving the hand.

One should choose object to analyze it in order to realization, how it is really like. The main point I have in mind, I should not analyzing how it is functioning but analyzing how to stop this functioning for me. For example "the hand" of enemy can hit me. So it will function as pain for me, right here "in front of my eyes" when my nose turned red. But I hope it will function no more when enlightenment, when the functioning seeming is no more. For me to have some kind of lack of universal inherent existence will not prevent my pain of the nose turned red also?

The actual objects are "made" by sentient beings only. Hopefully "there are" Buddhas too, and there "is" the Path for us to "be" also Buddhas "like" them, no longer "functional" sentient beings. Even when you are some kind of Sautrantika-leaning, it is not possible for you to totally "protect" the actual objects because they are interdependent arising from limitless causes/conditions since beginningless time, so they never were at the first place.

Kogtrul the Great "Treasury" (Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé: "The Treasury of Knowledge. Book Six, Part Three: Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy"; Section II: Mahayana; trans.

Elizabeth M. Callahan; Snow Lion Publications; Ithaca, New York; 2007) says:

- Sautrāntikas believe that External referents (phyi don) are considered to be hidden.

Because

[external referents objects] are past [when a consciousness arises], they are not what a consciousness sees. Thus, [Sautrāntikas posit] what is called “an image,” which is an appearance of consciousness that has been cast by the referent. Although the referent has ceased, the image that is consciousness set by that [referent] is experienced as the likeness of the referent. This is designated as the experience [of the referent]. A consciousness apprehending an object perceives by means of an image [acting] as an intermediary (bar du chod pa).

- Sautrāntikas state that percepts and their perceivers, as causes and results, arise sequentially, not simultaneously.
- Among the five bases (which are knowable objects), forms, mind, and either two or three of the mental events—feelings, discriminations, and, [in some cases,] intentions—exist substantially. Everything else is asserted to be imputedly existent entities—meaning that they are designated [as entities simply] in relation to [having some] aspects [of entities]—or to be imputedly existent nonentities (dngos med).
- They maintain that [the phenomena of] the three times are not substantially established, that they are mentally imputed entities.
- As for forms, like [the Vaibhāṣhikas] above, they say that there are two types: minute particles, which are building blocks; and gross phenomena, which are constructed with those. Sautrāntikas, however, say that minute particles circle [each other] and do not join, but they also have no interstices between them. Hence, they are perceived as touching, like [the pages of] a bound book...

Study the most fundamental reasonings of Nagarjuna to cure yourself from "the actual objects out there in front of yours eyes" until any blurred vision left but the "unblurred": -there is no any cause for arising of phenomena because they do not arise from itself,

other, both of these or neither of these (Vajra Slivers, the second reasoning of Nagarjuna), -phenomena have been never created, it is not possible to have the actual objects (negating arising, the third reasoning of Nagarjuna) (Four Limits, the fourth reasoning of Nagarjuna).

Moreover, without the possibility of the "unblurred" and the continuation towards it there will be "no business even saying Arya Nagarjuna's name". This is what connect us with buddhahood during the Path, because of the Buddha nature, "the perfect nature" possibility and the skilful usage of "illusory" the dependent (nature) during this Path. This "illusory "the dependent" of course is needed, not only Yogacara says it, but Svatantrika also.

(The Center of the Sunlit Sky, p.470) The imaginary nature is like mistakenly apprehending the visual appearances that are caused by blurred vision to be floating hairs and such. Since this is nothing but names and superimpositions, it does not exist at all. Therefore, the imaginary nature is "the lack of nature in terms of characteristics."

The other-dependent nature consists of dependently originating appearances, like the plain visual appearances seen by someone with blurred vision. These appear in an illusionlike manner but are without any nature of their own and do not really arise. Therefore, the other-dependent nature is "the lack of nature in terms of arising."

The ultimate lack of nature of the perfect nature has two aspects. First, although there is no personal identity, the perfect nature is what functions as the remedy for the notion of a personal identity. Just as an illusory ship to cross an illusory ocean, it serves as the means to cross the ocean of cyclic existence to the other shore of Nirvana. This remedial aspect is actually contained within the other-dependent nature, but it is the cause for realizing the ultimate. Therefore, it is included in the category of "the ultimate lack of nature." The second aspect of the perfect nature is the one from which enlightenment is attained through actively engaging in it. This aspect is undifferentiable from phenomenal identitylessness. Like space, it is omnipresent and not established as anything whatsoever. It can be compared to the free space that is the natural object of unimpaired vision when the eye defect of blurred vision has been cured and one realizes that what appeared as

floating hairs never actually existed anywhere. This aspect is “the ultimate lack of nature” per se.

There is the need to know the difference between actual imputation and abstract "hornlike" imputation, let alone the difference between other-dependent nature and imaginary nature. If you accept that dependent is wholly imputed, you accept existence of abstract "hornlike" imputation only (some kind of universal no matter if the imputation refers to this table or something other) instead of actual imputation for example the table itself as uniquely appears right in front of our eyes (other-dependent nature). So your world will be only fiction like "keep spinning" abstract something “there is in not Santa Claus, there is in not Santa Claus”, even when beautiful woman is walking in front of your eyes.

You should consider the actual imputation is only uniquely made because of individually corresponding unique appearance of other-dependent, not abstractly "hornlike" something. You need the other-dependent to be finished, not only the imputations, for the successful Path.

(The Center of the Sunlit Sky; page.565) If a table is different from its real existence, in terms of affecting the clinging to this table, what does it do to the table itself if one negates some hypothetical “real existence” that is different from the table and is even said to be nonexistent?

(page.566) In other words, our clinging to personal and phenomenal identities does not concern some abstract, nonexistent notion of “real existence” but what appears right in front of our eyes, which is what we then reify as tables, books, or persons.

(page.569) The actual target in the context of negating the two identities is the clinging to these identities on the subject side. Since there is no actual object of negation on the objective side, there is nothing to be relinquished there.

"In Praise of Dharmadhātu. Nāgārjuna and the Third Karmapa, Rangjung Dorje"; transl. Karl Brunnhölzl; Snow Lion Publications; New York 2007; page.60) says:

To give just a brief and general idea, the other-dependent nature is the mistaken imagination that appears as the unreal entities of subject and object, because these are appearances

under the influence of something other, that is, the latent tendencies of ignorance. It appears as the outer world with its various beings and objects; as one's own body; as the sense consciousnesses that perceive these objects and the conceptual consciousness that thinks about them; as the clinging to a personal self and real phenomena; and as the mental events, such as feelings, that accompany all these consciousnesses.

The imaginary nature covers the entire range of what is superimposed by false imagination onto the various appearances of the other-dependent nature, from the most basic sense of subject-object duality via a self and really existent phenomena up through the most rigid beliefs about what we and the world are. In other words, what appear as one's own body and mind form the bases for imputing a personal self.

When you have realization that an object has no nature of its own (the imaginary nature), the subject that holds on to this object dissolves naturally (the other-dependent nature), until unblurred vision = beyond all reference points, to reveal the perfect nature.

So-called "Mere Mentalists", for some kind of unclear business, describe the perfect nature as the really existent other-dependent nature being empty of the imaginary nature. They even say: "the whole universe which consists of the three worlds is mere mind", "only mind is real and that everything in the universe is nothing other than mind and created by it".

To conclude, Yogacara and Svatantrika are both soteriologically efficient. Svatantrika leads to the same result as Prasangika: the freedom from all reference points. Cittamatra also is useful for gradual pedagogical meditations on emptiness (Sunyata) as a step to Madhyamaka where the "Mind Only" is taken as one more reference point to be "passed beyond". Yogacara is useful as the "supplement" of Madhyamaka "what is beyond". They all can be useful as preparation to Highest Yoga tantra/Dzogchen. The best is the practice according to "pointing out instructions" of one's own HYYTantra/Dzogchen "spiritual friend" to be directly cured.

To locate the center of the sky is just impossible,
never can be found,
this type of the center,

like any other type of "the center" [appearances],
the unfindable.

So
*"Give up the surroundings,
Don't defend your headquarters
And conquer the citadel of self-surrender"*

for everything and everyone,
according to time and space,
but full of energy and life,
like the sun lights the darkness,
the illusionlike.

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made of my posts from <http://www.dharmawheel.net> forum

Appendix 1

I don't think there is "archeological" need for finding indian Madhyamaka again. I wonder if it is even possible? The same is for Indian Vajrayana, which is now tibetan "modified". Madhyamaka can be investigated successfully now and in tibetan version works compatible with the tibetan Mahamudra or Dzogchen today.

Nevertheless there is the link between conceptual analysis and realization of sunyata. For Tsongkhapa it is gradual and constant until Buddhahood. Like some kind of very well oiled machine, but not the mere illusion-like interdependent connection never ever "arisen" like in Svatantrika or Yogacara. To define conventionality, "the seeming", as "faulty" is not correct, because it suggests "useless". I prefer a term "the seeming" because is "useful"

although in illusion-like manner only. As for example Santideva explained in "His Way of the Bodhisattva; Bodhicharyavatara" the collapse of any analysis using valid cognition, until realization of Sunyata:

*"If what has been analyzed
Is analyzed through further analysis,
There is no end to it,
Because that analysis would be analyzed too.*

*Once what had to be analyzed has been analyzed,
The analysis has no basis left.
Since there is no basis, it does not continue.
This is expressed as nirvana."*

*"The ultimate is not the sphere of cognition.
It is said that cognition is the seeming."*

Khenpo Karl Brunnholzl often use in His "THE CENTER OF THE SUNLIT SKY" an alternative term "the deceiving" which I like because doesn't suggest useless: "Generally speaking, if a given philosophical system differentiates the two levels of seeming and ultimate reality, then in whatever way it does so, one it speaks about seeming, relative, or deceiving phenomena", it must also accept this mean that such phenomena are precisely something that is not established. Otherwise, why differentiate between two such levels?" The ultimate can have alternative term "undeceiving" here. Here I think everyone is free to investigate the meaning of Madhyamaka using terms that work. When one would use also a terms: the seeming as the "deceiving", the ultimate as the "undeceiving", it will sounds much better. But define the seeming as simply "the seeming" and the ultimate as ultimate, because it not seems to be, will be even more better.

The all "the seeming" (even if seems to be false) can be useful in Madhyamaka practice, let alone in Mahamudra or Dzogchen, so one can not say it is totally false. It's all about the "self-liberation", is not? For example Dzogchen Ponlop in His book "MIND BEYOND DEATH" pointed-out :

*"Therefore, Madhyamaka continually emphasizes "no arising,"
which cuts the process at the very beginning.*

Like Mahamudra and Dzogchen, Madhyamaka does not apply any antidotes to suppress or destroy the arising of emotions, other than the analysis that produces insight into their nature. When we analyze the emotions in this way, they are self-liberated. It is important to understand that these methods are not mere philosophy."

In Mahamudra and Dzogchen or Madhyamaka you cherish everything. Everything is useful, not simply the faulty. All is the play of Mahamudra, Dzogchen or Prajnaparamita. Everything is the "self-liberated". Here the intention is the same although another terminology designed for the purpose of their practice.

Moreover, the seeming can be the "self-liberated". Every "perceived object" is the self-liberated because "it" had not existed in the first place, never ever "was", always "un arisen", so there is nothing to liberate at all. In the book "WISDOM NECTAR: Dudjom Rinpoche's Heart Advice" (trans. by Ron Garry, Tsadra Foundation Series book) I found compatible and far more detailed quote from H.H. Dudjom Rinpoche:

"Do not meditate to arrive at a conclusion: "That's it!" If you meditate in that way, it becomes intellectual activity. Here, there is no object of meditation whatsoever nor even an instant of distraction. Distraction from resting in awareness is true delusion. Don't be distracted! Whatever thoughts arise, let them arise. Do not follow after them and do not suppress them. If you ask "In that case, what should I do?" whatever objective phenomena arise, whatever appears, do not grasp phenomena's appearing aspect as you rest in a fresh state, like a small child looking inside a temple. When all phenomena are left as they are, their appearance is not modified, their color does not change, and their brilliance does not diminish. If you do not spoil phenomena with clinging and grasping thoughts, appearances and awareness will nakedly manifest as empty and luminous wisdom.

However, many teachings considered to be very deep or extremely vast have left individuals of lesser intelligence mystified. If I put my finger on the concise essential meaning, it is this: In the gap between the last thought's cessation and the next's arising, isn't there a fresh, present knowing (da lta'i shes pa) that has not been modified even in the slightest—luminous, naked awareness? That itself is awareness's abiding state!

But one does not permanently abide within the nature of reality (de khona). Doesn't a thought suddenly arise? That is the natural display of awareness. However, if you do not recognize thoughts as soon as they arise,

they will naturally spread. This is called "the chain of delusion," the root of samsara. Simple recognition of thoughts as they arise breaks their flow. Release thoughts within that recognition. When you remain in that state, arising thoughts will all be liberated equally within awareness, the expanse of dharmakaya. This is the main practice in which the view and meditation of Cutting through Solidity (khregs chod) are cultivated as one."

Furthermore, I was advised one can integrated it with one's own practice. Simply comfortably sit with these profound pointing-out instructions in 7-point Vairochana position (-legs are crossed in vajra position or leveled on floor with left leg inside and right leg outside, -hands are placed right upon left with palms up at a distance 4 fingers below the navel or hands are on knees, -back is straight like an arrow, -head is slightly inclined forwards, -shoulders are level resting naturally like "the wings of a vulture" not connected with belly, but here: -relax with eyes open straight into space about 5 meters without glaring or moving the focus, -breathing comfortably with slightly open mouth where tongue can be placed behind the upper teeth). For more details please find a qualified Dzogchen teacher.

The problem is in the object-side perspective, the very reference point itself.

"Madhyamakas would say that objects are not perceived at all". But one can add They are not perceiving this very "not perceived at all" too because the total freedom from all reference points including this very freedom itself. These reference points are for example: object, non-object, wisdom, inherent existence...and so on. There are many paradoxes when one is going to use the object-side perspective, for example treating a Buddha like an object "out there", for example: the "fault" is in Him I'm not liberated, the "error" is in my root Lama I have not recognized Rigpa when He/She pointed it out...

To be honest, this very "the seeming which is not totally faulty" is called Alaya-vijnana, that is to say, according to Yogacara. However "it" should work as "the Path" for you. You need the Path until you are a sentient being whatever exactly your "the seeming" is, no more no less. It is not the "fault" of a Buddha you have not been the "self-liberated" yet.

If "the seeming" would be more "undeceived" you will be even able the see a Buddha who is talking to you, using words, concepts etc. like during conversations with bodhisattvas,

arhats.... When the collapse all the seeming you will be a Buddha when there is no more any division, reference points like conceptual or non-conceptual.

When one is using the subject-side perspective everything will work I think. Contrary to one is using the object-side perspective when one have to built epistemological very complicated system that should fit together and there is "infinite regress" without hope to complete it, as I understand for example Tsongkhapa.

The subject side perspective is clear and easy like it:

Animals, Humans, Pretas perceive differently. But there is the Path. Because of this Path, sentient beings by subject side perceive gross Nirmanakaya, bodhisattvas free from clinging perceive subtle Sambhogakaya, buddhas?.... because there is not any division at this level "they" can not continue to perceive but the Dharmakaya. The object of all of these is what? The division is where? Never was at the first place but only seems to. But until it seems to be division is also the Path. This Path leads to the no division. When division between "Buddha" and "sentient being" is completely no more, it means the all qualities (Dharmakaya, Rupakaya). This I meant by my sentence: All divisions belong to the seeming not to the buddhas.

Even when conventional phenomena "seem to be" also not disappeared for Nirmanakayas-buddhas, their the seeming is very different. Nirmanakayas have realization of Dharmakaya "non-division" and can emanate Sambhogakayas for Bodhisattvas. There is traditional analogy for it:

The seeming is like the dream. Nirmanakayas although experience dreams they are aware this is only dreaming and do not suffer but are free like in "lucid dreaming". Sentient beings take dreaming to be real and suffer whatever nightmare they are experiencing.

Nāgārjuna's Niraupamyastava says:

*"Lord, you have realized that saṃsāra
Is free from permanence and extinction
And lacks characteristics and what is to be characterized,
Just like a dream or an illusion."*

Āryadeva's Jñānasārasamucchaya:

*"A "something that has parts" does not exist,
Minute particles do not exist,
And what appears distinctly is unobservable—
Experiences are like a dream."*

From "The Center of Sunlit Sky":

“Thus, for Buddhist reasoning and meditation to be soteriologically efficient, it is crucial to acknowledge that their actual target lies not at the level of the apprehended objects—the notions of a real personal or phenomenal identity—but at the level of the apprehending subject—the largely unconscious and instinctive clinging to such identities.”

We can use also Yogacara which describes: when your have realization that an object has no nature of its own (the imaginary nature), the subject that holds on to this object dissolves naturally (the other-dependent nature), until unblurred vision = beyond all reference points, to reveal the perfect nature. Moreover Yogacara as a supplement of Madhyamaka is more detailed what "seems to be" Buddhahood, why "the seeming is not totally faulty" and how the Path works for us.

In Yogacara there are the 3 natures:

(1)The imaginary nature is like mistakenly apprehending the visual appearances that are caused by blurred vision to be floating hairs and such. Since this is nothing but names and superimpositions, it does not exist at all. Therefore, the imaginary nature is “the lack of nature in terms of characteristics.”

(2)The other-dependent nature consists of dependently originating appearances, like the plain visual appearances seen by someone with blurred vision. These appear in an illusionlike manner but are without any nature of their own and do not really arise. Therefore, the other-dependent nature is “the lack of nature in terms of arising.”

(3)The ultimate lack of nature is the perfect nature: Like space, it is omnipresent and not established as anything whatsoever. It can be compared to the free space that is the natural object of unimpaired vision when the eye defect of blurred vision has been cured and one realizes that what appeared as floating hairs never actually existed anywhere. This aspect is “the ultimate lack of nature” per se.

The process of unenlightenment according to the 3 natures is explained by Maitreya’s Distinguishing Phenomena and Pure Being (with the Commentary by Mipham Jamyang

Namgyal (1846-1912), transl. Jim Scott under the guidance of Khenpo Tsültrim Gyamtso Rinpoche; Snow Lion Publications):

*As duality plus assumption and formulation,
Whose appearance is the mistaken conceptual process,
Since what appears is not and is thus not real.
No referents have ever existed either
And, being but concept, consist of conceptualization.*

And is elaborated by Ju Mipham:

All phenomena, which are composed of dualistic appearance (the other-dependent nature) to which dualistic assumption is added (conceptually; the imaginary nature), are nothing other than complete imputations having no existence with an actual constituent of their own, while nevertheless appearing (by such examples as the strands of hair which appear to a victim of cataracts, as the other-dependent nature is not just nothingness).

This Yogacara here is compatible what Madhyamaka says:

Everything is interdependent and created by causes and conditions, ultimately there are no any inherently, independently existed phenomena but also because conventionally everything exists relatively depending on something else there is no total nothingness (view beyond extremisms, the middle way, analyse through interdependent arising, the fifth reasoning of Nagarjuna, the king of all reasonings)

Ju Mipham further explains the process of enlightenment according to the 3 natures:

- *What appears to the nonconceptual sensory faculty as a duality of perceived and perceiver*
- *The process of formulation conducted by the rational mind, which is conceptual and first makes the assumption that whatever appears to be a duality actually exists that way and then formulates it by assigning a specific term; this is a process which is internal and equivalent to the rational mind's conceptualization of percept and perceiver*
- *The inner faculties, that of the eye and so on*
- *Outer objects, form and so on*
- *The principles of awareness, the eye consciousness, and so on*
- *Vessel-like worlds' appearances experienced in common.*

Since these are all absent, suchness (the perfect nature) free of all these types of differentiation appears in its one taste (beyond reference points unimpaired vision, by example when the eye defect of blurred vision has been cured and one realizes that what appeared as floating hairs is no longer obstructive for the vision after the cure). This is

what is referred to as “the subsiding of dualistic appearance into emptiness (Sunyata beyond extremes).”

The other-dependent nature is not totally faulty but the imaginary nature as the (conceptual) designations, because the perfect nature can be pointed-out using the dependent nature. The perfect nature is not the dependent nature let alone the imaginary nature, because is pointed-out beyond them: beyond the duality of the dependent nature, and beyond (conceptual) designations of the imaginary nature concerning this duality (of perceived and perceiver).

In other words, "the non-existence of the imagined nature in the other-dependent nature" makes possible to point-out the perfect nature and makes therefore the dependent nature useful or not totally faulty.

This has an analogy to:

the seeming is not totally faulty because can be the self-liberated. This very self-liberation is when there is no more conceptuality.

Here quotes that agree with it:

IN PRAISE OF DHARMADHĀTU; ithaca, new york; Nāgārjuna and the Third Karmapa, Rangjung Dorje; Translated and introduced by Karl Brunnhölzl, p.103:

Likewise,

once the adventitious stains—or, more personally speaking, we as sentient beings—have dissolved, it is a moot question whether “our” dharmadhātu (or buddha nature) and “all the rest” of the dharmadhātu (or the buddha natures of all Buddhas) are the same or different, since what is called a sentient being is nothing but the very mistakenness that makes up such a distinction.

p.101:

*From the point of view of what appears to the sentient beings who obscure this very [Heart; Buddha Nature] and other beings to be guided, it appears as if they have become Buddhas, which is just seeming buddhahood. At this point, once the adventitious stains have become pure, it appears as if this very buddhahood needed to become completely perfect omniscient buddhahood gain. But in terms of the definitive meaning, this very Buddha heart is buddhahood by its sheer presence. Therefore, it does not need to become buddhahood again, and nothing else is able to make it become buddhahood either. ...As Lord Karmapa Tūsum Kyenba sang:
If there is no change in buddhahood,
There is no aspiration to attain all these fruitions.*

How Nirmanakaya could be born out of Dharmakaya "non-division", and so on? I guess Nirmanakaya-buddha does not need concepts because already knows precisely the seeming of students (the omniscience). The omniscience is not only the freedom from concepts, but from all "the seeming" as Yogacara explained in "The Treasury of Knowledge. Frameworks of Buddhist Philosophy" by Jamgön Kongtrul Lodrö Tayé:

"The dependent and imagined [characteristics] are equal in that they do not really exist (bden par med); equal in being delusive appearances; and equal in being conventionalities and false. It is necessary, however, to distinguish them in terms of their respective characteristics: imagined [characteristics] do not exist even on a conventional [level], whereas the dependent do exist conventionally."

For sure we are not able to understand what the omniscience of a Buddha is. All we have is our sentient being's cognition. Buddhahood is attained when all clingings are no more (7th level "Far gone" of Bodhisattwa where one's wisdom outshines Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas) and all cognitive obcurations are no more (11th level of Buddhahood). We are sentient beings because we experience suffering (dukkha) from clingings to reference points and we are not able to be beyond the cognition of the seeming which is even more subtle to attain than clingings (cognition of these very reference points, very subtle dualism).

Clingings to reference points are the cause for our suffering (Dukkha) because for example:

- we locate the single separated self-identity although there is not such at all (because there would be exist only one's own single self without any danger of destroying by itself because of non-existence of components of this self or by others because of separation from outside)
- we locate permanent self-identity although there is not such at all (because one wouldn't be worried what was going to happen to him the next moment, also identity is not in one's body and mind because they are totally changed many times during one's lifetime)
- we locate independent self-identity although there is not such at all (because one shouldn't be worried what happened to him than to others)

Cognitive obscurations to the omniscience (cognition of these very reference points) are even far beyond conceptuality. So if there is an example in whatever Sutra that Buddha had some pain or difficulties it was for sure a "display" only of the seeming. When there is any pain or suffer there has to be a sentient being.

Nevertheless, when the seeming is "self-liberated" it is not fault or benefit from any Buddha somewhere "out there" outside us. The freedom from all reference points simply means the unblurred unimpaired vision (omniscience) because already no more obscured by reference points and clingings to them, not because reference points somehow lead to it. Reference points never have been arisen or existed according to the 5 arguments of Nagarjuna, so they do not need be liberated and the omniscience does not need be created once more. Conceptuality does not lead to the self-liberation because there is no time for its existence since already self-liberated. This is Madhyamaka, which is also compatible with Dzogchen/Mahamudra. In Dzogchen for example there is term "Kadak" primordial purity because omniscience "does not need be created once more".

I guess if the idea of omniscience (unblurred, unimpaired vision) is to know all infinitive causes/conditions during these very causes/conditions, there would be no need to wait (what happens in the future) because the solving already was contained in the very incalculable moment. Therefore concepts would be not necessary because what is evident.

Nevertheless, this conclusion is still an amazing abstract, which like every abstract is a concept only, a simplification in endless hardship what is total and beyond concepts. Even "the unblurred, unimpaired vision" is really not such at all, but only because our blurred and impaired reference points are real for us only. There are many amazing abstracts, concepts: "all of infinitive causes", "incalculable moment", "the future" or "the unblurred, unimpaired vision" we are taking as the reality although there is nothing beyond them to be caught "out there".

Moreover, according to Yogacara to know details of future events are just "imaginary nature" for example because there is no "fatum" or "sin" in Buddhism. If the details of

future be possible to know they would be possible only by all-knowing buddhas "out there", so out of our reach "out here". One more object-side perspective paradox. To experience the knowable things is "other-dependent nature" (the seeming which is not totally faulty). Both of them are just the seeming, experienced by sentient beings as reference points for their clingings and cognitive obscurations. "The perfect nature" is beyond these reference points because liberation from samsara (Dukkha) including all the seeming, the deceived (not only concepts) and realization of the 3 Kayas (Dharmakaya, Sambhogakaya, Nirmanakaya).

According to Madhyamaka the "Two Truths" division is only from deceiving perspective of sentient beings (the seeming): conventional - it is not possible to know by them the infinitive causes/conditions or cognitions of any object, ultimate - is not possible for sentient beings to have the freedom from all reference points. Conventional reality of any object is "workable daily life" consensus only as far as not analyzed. When analyzed is completely lost.

In Buddhahood there is no such division: if Buddha would know precisely the seeming (the omniscience) it will be the total freedom from all reference points.

The both "the two truths" are the same impossible for sentient beings, and the same beyond "the mind of sentient being" from the perspective of buddhas. So there is no any basis for divisions at all.

The object-side perspective is not soteriologically efficient for sentient beings, in contrast to Buddhahood where there is no need to catch anything (e.g. wisdom) because everything already the "self-liberated", which means "the omniscience of Buddhahood=unblurred unimpaired vision".

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made of my posts from <http://www.dharmawheel.net> forum

IX Karmapa wrote in "The Feast for the Fortunate. A Commentary on the Entrance to the Middle Way That Easily Pulls Along the Chariot of the Takpo Kagyü Siddhas (of the VIII Karmapa)" in "The Karmapa,s Middle Way. Feast for the Fortunate. The Ninth Karmapa, Wangchuk Dorje" by Tyler Dewar. Snow Lion Publications:

There are some, such as Gorampa and Shākya Chokden, who say that this verse [verse 6.75 of the Entrance] proves that Chandrakīrti holds, from his own perspective, that self-awareness exists conventionally. They also say that in Chandrakīrti's tradition the all-base, self-awareness, outer objects, and the person all exist conventionally, but they do not exist as "conventional phenomena that can withstand analysis." These positions are untenable. The master Chandrakīrti does not, as his own position, accept any phenomenon as existent or nonexistent in either ultimate or conventional truth. What need is there to mention his position on the "existence" of self-awareness? Since the earlier and later consciousnesses are not [inherently] different substances, it is possible to say, [repeating after worldly people], that what is experienced initially is also experienced by memory and that what is unique to that experience is also unique to its memory. Thus a later consciousness can remember something by thinking, "I saw it before." Yet this relation between experience and memory is simply the way conventions work in the world. It is not to be thoroughly analyzed: worldly conventions are by nature false.

So according to the Karmapa for Gorampa "outer objects exist conventionally" somewhere "out there" although can not withstand analysis?

Endnote 298:...The issue at hand here whether there is a difference with regard to the ontological status of the relative truth and the conventional truth brings to light a key point on which the two masters differ. The passage of Gorampa referenced here is found in his commentary to the Entrance to the Middle Way entitled Dispelling Bad Views: A Sectional Outline of the Entrance to the Middle Way and an Analysis of Each of the Text's Difficult Points (Gorampa Sönam Senge 1979, p. 608). Whereas Gorampa distinguishes between what is "conventional" and what is "relative," Mikyö Dorje and Wangchuk Dorje seem to treat the two terms as synonyms. Another point on which Mikyö Dorje and Gorampa differ is explained above in a footnote to the discussion regarding Zilungpa's

position on whether afflictive obscurations pervade clinging to true existence.

Gorampa seems to be classifying relative truth into the two categories of correct relative truth and false relative truth, with the latter category being composed of phenomena that would not qualify as existents. The Karmapa, however, and as explained in the text, holds the false relative as not belonging to the relative truth at all.

Using the quote of the Karmapa I suspect for Gorampa the worldly perspective alone is not all that is needed for positing relative truth.

They (Gorampa) also say that in Chandrakīrti's tradition the all-base, self-awareness, outer objects, and the person all exist conventionally, but they do not exist as "conventional phenomena that can withstand analysis." These positions are untenable.

The book explained:

Since the dependent nature does not even slightly exist, it cannot be the cause or basis of relative appearances as the Proponents of Consciousness claim. By positing an utterly false basis of the relative truth, the Proponents of Consciousness lose the relative truth of the world completely. In the view of Chandrakīrti, the worldly perspective alone is all that is needed for positing relative truth. Chandrakīrti identifies the relative truth of the world of no analysis as the method, and the ultimate truth, the realization of the way things are, as what arises from relating to that method skillfully.

As Nāgārjuna's Fundamental Wisdom proclaims:

Without relying on conventions,

One cannot realize the ultimate.

Without realizing the ultimate,

One cannot attain nirvāṇa. (24.10)

Further IX Karmapa wrote:

In sum, for the Consequentialists all relative things are, even in the relative truth, empty of performing their own functions. ... For the relative truth is merely something posited from the confused perspective of worldly beings who cling to it as real. (The Feast; p.162)

(The Feast; p.249)Nāgārjuna's Commentary on the Heart of Awakening

(Bodhichittavivaraṇa, Changchub Semdrel/byang chub sems 'grel)

supports:

*There is no difference between things in dreams and things in the waking state
In terms of their performance of functions.*

All things are the same as things in a dream:

They are equal in terms of performing functions, but they have no inherent nature.

As I understand the Karmapa there is not necessity to argue here. The outer objects are accepted in order to guide worldly beings using rules of the debate although the meditation based on the view on outer objects will be not soteriologically efficient.

Quote from the Karmapa (The Feast; p.164):

Nevertheless, there is no fault when the master Nāgārjuna conventionally relies on presentations of the relative truth that accord with the worldly perspective and that are merely temporary supports for those who desire liberation to adopt what is beneficial and reject what is counter productive. Such presentations vanquish all the misconceptions of the inferior Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical systems, which propound the existence of things.

Hope for Gorampa "these things" cannot bear analysis although He performs the "illusion-like" debate using them for the help of others.

Nagarjuna's famous statement on this issue in his Rebuttal of Objections says:

If I had any position,

I thereby would be at fault.

Since I have no position,

I am not at fault at all.

If there were anything to be observed

Through direct perception and the other instances [of valid cognition],

It would be something to be established or rejected.

However, since no such thing exists, I cannot be criticized.

However, these not contradict possibility the analysis for one's own help will lead to the collapse until realization? The analysis is not meaningless. As for Mahamudra or Dzogchen it can be also the support.

Here I made the synthesis:

The "self-liberation" for Centrists (Madhyamikas) means never need (process, production, possibility) of liberation of what was never in the first place. Never need (process, production, possibility) of liberation of the seeming which was never in the first place (sentient beings; obscurations to liberation and to omniscience). Never need (process, production, possibility) of liberation of perfect nirvāṇa by nature which was never in the first place (buddhahood).

It also means there is always the need (process, production, possibility) for worldly beings of the Dharma Path as the method of the seeming (the obscurations to liberation and to omniscience).

Why it is the method of the seeming only. Because for worldly beings in Mahayana it seems to last the three incalculable eons during many reincarnations as bodhisattva, in tantra one human lifetime, in Dzogchen seems to be already the "self-liberated". So where is the time here when the method is possible? So according to Centrists the method was never at the first place.

Nevertheless, until it seems to be division is also the Path. This Path leads to the no division. When division between "Buddha" and "sentient being" is completely no more, it means the all qualities (Dharmakaya, Sambhogakaya, Nirmanakaya). This means: All divisions belong to the seeming not to the buddhas.

According to realized Madhyamikas (Centrists) the "Two Truths" division is only from deceiving perspective of sentient beings (the seeming): conventional - it is not possible to know by worldly beings the infinitive causes/conditions or cognitions of any object, ultimate - is not possible for worldly beings to have the freedom from all reference points.

Conventional reality of any object is "workable daily life" consensus only as far as not analyzed (worldly beings). When analyzed is completely lost (realized Centrists).

In Buddhahood there is no such division: if Buddha would know precisely the seeming (the omniscience) it will be the total freedom beyond all reference points (the 3 Kayas of Buddhahood).

The both "the two truths" are the same impossible for sentient beings, and the same beyond "the seeming of sentient being" (so impossible for sentient beings) from the perspective of buddhas. So there is no any basis or need for divisions here.

Nevertheless, you as a worldly being to be trained, use the analysis until its total collapse, so you will realize you were only pointed-out by analysis although there had never been any reference point in the first place (including this analysis itself).

Finally there is total collapse of all divisions (such the two truths), so called "unblurred unimpaired vision" (the freedom beyond all reference points including this very freedom itself). However, If you now without collapsing the analysis, as a worldly being, use it to create new reference point again and call it the "one truth", it will be no longer the "antidote" (the method) for you "worldly being" given by realized Madhyamikas, but the "poison" of eternalism.

"The Feast" (page 152) quotes IX Karmapa:

Does the refutation of arising from the four extremes apply to ultimate truth or to conventional truth? The Autonomists (Svātantrika, Ranggyüpa/rang rgyud pa) assert that it only applies to the ultimate truth, but here, [in the Consequentialist system], arising from the four extremes is refuted in both truths. This is explained by this very treatise in the following and other verses:

Reasonings prove that arising from self and other

Are illogical in suchness.

Since they also prove that arising is illogical conventionally,

On what basis do you speak of "arising"?" (6.36)

One may protest, "It follows that you deny the conventional arising of phenomena, because for you phenomena do not arise from the four extremes." It is true we do not assert "conventional arising." However, to ensure that our presentation does not lapse from the worldly perspective renowned to others, and to avoid denying the connection between actions and results, we present conventional arising from the perspective of others. When doing so, we accept and proclaim from the perspective of others an arising resembling the arising of dreams and reflections. Arising in this context is synonymous with dependent

arising, free from the four extremes. We describe arising, actions, results, and so on merely in accordance with what is accepted in the world.

Therefore, the consequence that arising would not exist even conventionally does not apply to us: when we speak of arising, we do so free of any logical analysis. When we analyze with logic, no arising is accepted. Since arising accepted in the context of analysis would definitely entail one of the four extremes, we do not accept any form of arising when engaged in analysis.

Therefore, although Followers of the Middle Way do not accept arising even on the conventional level from their own perspective, they do accept arising and so forth on the conventional level from the perspective of others. There is no contradiction in doing this, because accepting something from the perspective of others is not an assertion of one's own position. It is, rather, a mere repetition of what others say, like an echo. This principle can be applied to all instances of accepting something provisionally. According to Rendawa one should not refute arising on the conventional level if there has been no analysis, because the arising free of the four extremes is dependent arising. Furthermore, worldly people say things like “sprouts arise from seeds” and so on, and it is necessary to speak in harmony with the world. However, arising from any of the four extremes is not to be accepted even on the conventional level. It seems that on this topic there are no great contradictions between the position of Rendawa and that expressed here.

In sum, mere dependent arising, free from the four extremes, is emptiness. It is the path of the Middle Way, the antidote to all views. It is not a mistake, therefore, to accept arising conventionally from the perspective of others and at the same time say that there is no arising even conventionally. This is so because upon analyzing dependent arising it is seen to be free from all extremes. Therefore whoever propounds arising from any of the four extremes is not a proponent of dependent arising. The master Nāgārjuna, in a praise to the Buddha, said:

*Logicians imagine that
Suffering is created by itself,
By others, by both, or causelessly.
You taught that it arises in dependence.*

Those who speak of dependent arising are free of bias; in neither of the two truths do they fall into any of the four or eight extremes. Since they are free of clinging to anything, they do not lapse from ultimate truth. Since they are free from error regarding any mundane or transcendent conventions, they also do not lapse from relative truth. For that reason, the master Nāgārjuna said (Fundamental Wisdom):
*For the one for whom emptiness is possible,
 Everything is possible.....*

The sūtras say:

*Those who study a teaching and become attached to it
 Will become angry when they hear something that is not that
 teaching.
 Their pride and conceit will defeat them
 And lead them only to suffering.*

Those who desire liberation must first let go of their clinging to positions. They will then be capable of relying on the teachings of Nāgārjuna, which explain the nature of reality in a way that harmonizes with what is generally accepted in the world. They should train in the essential point that all phenomena are merely dependently arisen. This training itself will become the cause of their liberation. From the perspective of analysis, and from the perspective of the noble ones, even interdependence and the liberation that its realization causes are inexpressible. Nothing is attained, and no one attains anything. At the time of realizing this, one does not even say that such things “do not exist.” One does not attempt any description using words such as “exist,” “does not exist,” “both,” or “neither.” At that time, one does not conceive of anything. One does not fixate on anything. One does not apply any effort. One does not do anything. In this great state of no action itself, one rests uncontrived, loosely, and evenly. When resting in that way, all appearances of the sixfold collection of consciousness are appearance emptiness, sound-emptiness, awareness emptiness. Look nakedly. Rest in their naked liberation.

This is the supreme view and meditation of the Middle Way.

.....Followers of the Middle Way, therefore, do not affirm nonexistence through refuting existence. Nor do they affirm or accept “being neither” through refuting “being

both." The refutations of existence, being both, being neither, and so on are simply words used to undermine the wrong thinking of others. They are accepted merely as statements from the perspective of other, worldly beings. Relying on them as such, the Followers of the Middle Way reverse others' misconceptions. They do not refute anything or affirm anything as their own system. They simply speak in accordance with the following quotation from Shāntideva's Entrance to the Conduct of Bodhisattvas:

All analyses depend

On simply what is renowned in the world. (9.108cd)

It is important to quote IX Karmapa what I in my English wrote "the seeming is not totally faulty" but „points-out" for worldly beings only:

(The Feast; p.224) Granted that, ultimately, there are not two truths.

Yet, conventionally, the relative truth is not just confusion but it is also a method for realizing the ultimate truth. Without analyzing whether relative phenomena arise from themselves or from something different than themselves, the Followers of the Middle Way accept from the perspective of others whatever is asserted by worldly people on the basis of worldly ways.

When one analyzes to find whether relative things—forms, feelings, etc. arise from themselves or other and so on, one cannot find any abiding thing apart from the suchness that is the true nature of those things.

This suchness itself is the ultimate truth, free of arising and ceasing. The arising, ceasing, and so on of the relative truth cannot be found.

(p.279) (Chandrakirti) *The conventional truth is the method;*

The ultimate truth is what arises from the method.

Those who do not know the distinctions between these two

Will, due to wrong thinking, follow inferior paths. (6.80)

This verse explains the reasons why falling from the two truths will make attaining liberation impossible. The conventional truth refers to the inter dependent phenomena,

aggregates, constituents, and sources taught by the perfect Buddha as methods for realizing the ultimate truth. The teaching on the ultimate truth is what arises from such methods. The ultimate truth is taught in dependence upon the conventional truth. And through comprehending the ultimate truth, one attains the ultimate, that is, nirvāṇa.

In this context, the following are synonyms: that which arises from methods, the result, that which is to be attained, that which is to be realized, the object that is to be seen by the wisdom of meditative equipoise, and non-abiding nirvāṇa.

Here an example:

Take "1" as a reference point and take "0" as a non-reference point.

Take "state 1" as the relative and "state 0" as the ultimate.

Here there are Madhyamikas who always accept the reference points:

if "1" is existed in "state 1" = "1" is not existed in "state 0"

So because of what we locate in "state 1" (the relative), we always need to locate something in "state 0" (the ultimate)

{precisely the one case need to be located}

Here there are Madhyamikas who never accept reference points:

if "1" is never existed in "state 1" = ["1" is never existed in "state 0" = "1" is never existed in "state 1" = "1" is never existed in both "state 0" or "state 1" = "1" is never existed in neither "state 0" nor "state 1"]

So because of what we never locate in "state 1" (the relative), we never need to locate anything in "state 0" (the ultimate)

{there is never need to locate any cases, whatever "1" or the same can be with "0" (non-reference point)}

Take also Yogacara as the supporting:

Is the dependent nature ultimate or not in Yogacara texts. I think that actually the answer is no. Please read what I wrote about "the antidote, medicine". To look at the moon, it is necessary to gaze beyond the finger which points-out the moon. I hope the finger, the necessary tool only, is not too big for you.

Here you have to original Yogacara ("Middle Beyond Extremes Maitreya's Madhyāntavibhāga" with commentaries by Khenpo Shenga and Ju Mipham; Snow Lion; 2006; page. 74):
"Emptiness is asserted to be the absence of entities, This non-entity, and natural. Absence of self is taught to be an absence of characteristics, Characteristics that conflict with that, [III.7]"

- 1.the absence of entities with respect to the imaginary nature, because it does not exist in any way at all.
- 2.With respect to the dependent nature, it is empty in the sense that this lack of entity is itself a non-entity, for while nothing exists as imagined, it is not the case that wakefulness does not exist.
- 3.And the thoroughly established nature, in being the essence of emptiness alone, is held to be naturally empty.

So these are the Three types of absence of self only: The imaginary nature is taught to be an absence of characteristics because it does not possess any characteristics. The characteristics of the dependent nature is taught only with reference to those characteristics that conflict with that [which is imagined]. And since the thoroughly established nature is selfless by its very essence, it is taught to be selfless in terms of its own characteristics.

So as I understand it, the ālayavijñāna/the dependent nature is posited to be truly existent only from POV of the conflict with the imaginary. In other words is accepted only as a worldly convention, the "antidote, medicine" to point-out what is the naturally empty.

Khenpo Chenga from "The Karmapa's Middle Way. Feast for the Fortunate. The Ninth Karmapa, Wangchuk Dorje" by Tyler Dewar. Snow Lion Publications :

Emptiness and the false imagination are not empty, yet they are not not empty of apprehended and apprehender either. This explains it all, both the conditioned, which is referred to as the "false imagination," and the unconditioned, which is referred to as "empty." Because

of the existence of the false imagination, the non-existence of apprehended and apprehender, and the existence of emptiness, there is nothing that is unequivocally either empty or not empty. This is the path of the Middle Way.

So as I understand, it is still the middle way, the pointing-out the freedom beyond the reference points. Moreover, the intention is the same even considering Vajrayāna/Dzogchen, let alone Yogacara or Madhyamaka. The difference makes only the method. Of course Mahamudra and Dzogchen are very different because of its method from Madhyamaka/Yogacara these days.

If you wonder if it is Shentong, look for example what Karl Brunnhölzl in "The Center" discovered:

... as a very rough outline, one may distinguish three main streams (of Yogacara):

- 1) the distinct system of Maitreya, Asanga, and Vasubandhu (the lineage of vast activity)*
- 2) a later, in parts more "idealistic" Yogacara (cittamatrins), as exemplified by Dharmapala (530-561)*
- 3) an epistemologically oriented tradition, headed by Dignaga and Dharmakīrti.*

...Bhavaviveka's critique of Yogacara starts in The Lamp of Knowledge, his commentary on The Fundamental Verses. In the first chapter of this text, he criticizes Gunamati's commentary on The Fundamental Verses. In the twenty-fifth chapter, he attacks the view of the three natures, especially that the other-dependent nature is really existent (a position held by Gunamati and Dharmapala). Here, he quotes seven verses from Maitreya's Distinction between the Middle and Extremes and once from Asanga's commentary on The Fundamental Verses.

("Middle Beyond Extremes Maitreya's Madhyāntavibhāga" with commentaries by Khenpo Shenga and Ju Mipham; Snow Lion; 2006) - Ju Mipham, page 27:

When the false imagination, the mere awareness of dualistic appearances, occurs within cyclic existence, these directly perceived appearances exist in an undecieving way from the perspective of that which experiences them (the dependent nature). However, the apparent separation between the apprehended and apprehender is not actually present. And yet that emptiness, the absence of apprehended and apprehender, is present in the subject, the false imagination, as its intrinsic nature (the perfect nature).

This is soteriologically efficient:

If one asserts the non-existence of the imagination, cyclic existence will become absolutely

non-existent and one will incur the fault of denigrating conventions. If one refutes emptiness, failing to comprehend that it exists in terms of its being established in relation to that subject (the subject perspective), the imagination, then the apprehended and apprehender will end up being existent and one will incur the fault of exaggerating their status as ultimate.

Here you see more the Yogacara is the compatible:

Take following example: "This is a tree" is only a worldly convention. However it is correct (worldly convention) for worldly beings in contrast to false (worldly convention) for those beings, as for example "this is a monster" in the dark.

Madhyamika (a follower of Madhyamaka) will never locate any reference point ("This is a tree") in the Two Truths (Prasangika), (and also never posit the conventional is false or the conventional is correct), but for the purpose of the debate to help worldly beings understand Madhyamaka He sometimes uses suitable worldly conventions as only the "antidote, medicine" for them (Svatantra; autonomous position), for example "this is a tree" instead of "this is a monster". To free them "from the all reference points", from clinging to the Two Truths, to gradually lead them or to point-out "the freedom beyond the seeming"="unblurred, unimpaired vision" or at least to show them "the seeming is not totally faulty", respect the karma law of cause/result, and especially here to free from fear of the "monster in the dark", and so on.

"The Center of the Sunlit Sky: Madhyamaka in the Kagyu Tradition", Snow Lion Publications, 2004, page 482 explains it using the subject-side perspective:

"Thus, the three natures are not three different ontological "things." It is not that by subtracting one (the imaginary nature) from the other (the other-dependent nature), one arrives at the third (the perfect nature). Rather, Yogacara talks about the other-dependent nature as the experiential ground for a dynamic process of disillusioning and refining our perception, with the imaginary nature and the perfect nature being the "extremes" of mistaken and pure perception respectively. Thus, the other-dependent nature stands for the continuity of experience, which is impure when imagined as the imaginary nature and pure or perfected when this imaginary nature has been seen through. Since the realization of the perfect nature is still an experience and not something abstract or just nothing, it is said that the other-dependent nature in its pure aspect is the perfect nature. In this way, "other-dependent nature" is just a term for the compound meaning of the imaginary nature

and the perfect nature, which points to the underlying experiential continuity of a mind stream that becomes increasingly aware of its own true nature."

This is what I meant "the seeming is not totally faulty" but "points-out", the „soteriologically efficient“, and what I found "compatible" whatever if Yogacara or Madhyamaka:

Worldly beings as Animals, Humans, Pretas perceive differently. But there is the Path for them indeed. Because of this Path, sentient beings by subject-side perceive gross Nirmanakaya, bodhisattvas free from clinging perceive subtle Sambhogakaya, buddhas?.... because there is not any division at this level "they" can not continue to perceive but the Dharmakaya. The object of all of these is what? The division is where? For Centrists never was at the first place but only seems to. Nevertheless, until it seems to be division is also the Path. This Path leads to the no division. When division between "Buddha" and "sentient being" is completely no more, it means the all qualities (Dharmakaya, Sambhogakaya, Nirmanakaya*).

*descriptions of buddhist terminology can be found in my other notes, please read the Notes on The Gradual Path to Enlightenment, the "Lamrim" at http://www.lamrimnotes.webs.com/notes_on_lamrim.html

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